In the experiments on Prisoner's Dilemma reported by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) 
reported by Rapoport and Chammah (1965) (Morehous, 1966) . Note that the mean frequency of C choices on the second play of a two-play run is smaller than that of the first play. This, however, could also be attributed to the &dquo;initial decline&dquo; effect, since predominantly less cooperation is observed on the second play than on the first in any iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (cf. Rapoport and Chammah, 1965, p. 89 2 A symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma game is designated by a quadruple (R, T, S, P), where R stands for the payoff received by two cooperating players (reward); T the payoff to the lone defector (temptation); S the payoff to the lone cooperator (sucker's or saint's payoff) ; P the payoff to the two defecting players (punishment).
